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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.l4658

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the Utah State Tax Commission,
from an Order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, granting the oral Motion for Summary Judgrnent on all issues in favor of the Utah State Department of
Finance, and denying the Tax Commission's

~lotion

for Su.'lllllary

Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks to have the trial court's Order
reversed, for an Order declaring Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-14-4 (1953)

lawful and valid, for an Order granting

Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and requiring defendant to pay the taxes lawfully due and owing, or in the alternative to remand the case to the District Court to resolve all
genuine issues of material fact.
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S7ATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred
to as "Tax Commission" or "plaintiff") is a body politic
charged with

certai~

duties and responsibilities as set forth

in the Utah State Constitution and the Statutes of the State
of Utah, including wtah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-46 (1953).
One of the Tax Commission's primary functions is to see that
the tax laws are

a~~inistered

properly.

Pursuant to this

responsibility, the Tax Commission attempted to collect taxes
which were owing from the State Insurance Fund pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-14-4 (1953) the relevant
portions of which, are as follows:
"Every insurance company engaged in
the transaction of business in this state
shall pay to the State Tax Commission, on
or before the thirty-first day of March in
each year:
(1) ..•• (b) A tax of 1% of the total
premiums receivedby it during the next preceding calendar year from insurance written
within this state by any insurance fund or
funds c~eated by Charter 100, Laws of Utah
1917, to be collected by the State Tax Commission and to cover into the State Treasury
to the credit of the State General Fund.
This tax shall be in addition to any and
all taxes levied under this section.

* * *
(3)
Every insurance company engaged
in the transaction of business in this state
writing workmen's compensation or occupational disease disability insurance shall pay to
the state tax commission, on or before the
thirty-first day of March in each year, a
tax of 3-1/4% of the total premiums received
by it during the next preceding calendar year
from workmen's compensation or occupational
disease disability insurance, subject to all
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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provisions, limitations and exceptions
contained in this section. The state tax
commission shall pay all of the tax collected except the l/4% into the state treasury
to the credit of the special fund provided
for in subsection (1) of section 35-1-68.
The balance of the tax collected shall be
paid into the state treasury to the credit
of the state general fund. No tax that is
to be transferred into the general fund shall
be collected on premiums received by the department of finance in the state insurance
fund from the state and its several departments
and from counties, cities, towns, school districts, or any other self-insured political
entities.
The State Insurance Fund is one alternative from which
employers may choose, to provide their employees with workmens' compensation insurance.

The cost of its premiums are

only fifty to seventy percent of the cost of premiums of the
other two methods, private insurance carriers and self-insurance.
The State Insurance Fund (also referred to herein as
the Fund) is administered by the Utah State Department of Finance (hereinafter referred to as "Department" or "Defendant").
The Department has repeatedly refused to pay the tax imposed
by U.C.A., Section 31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), claiming it is unconsti tutional.
The State Insurance Fund is established, and its operations are governed and regulated, by Chapter 3 of Title 35
of the Utah Code Annotated, to which the numbers hereafter
will largely refer.

It has been held by this Court that it "is

a state-administered mutual insurance program established by
the Legislature for the purpose of insuring employers against
liability for compensation and assuring to the persons entitled
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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law."

Gronning v.Smart,

561 P.2d 690.

The State Insurance

Fund is a public fund and is publicly administered by a
public body, the Finance Commission.

Chez v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 62 P. 2d 549, 90 Utah 447.

While

it is a "public fund" it is also not public money to be
spent in any manner desired by the public authorities, but
rather the legislature, in Title 35, Chapter 3, U.C.A.,
has set forth the relationship between the State Insurance
Fund and other state agencies.
The State Insurance Fund is very unique as i t is
literally in a class by itself.

While it is similar to pri-

vate insurnace companies in that it is set up and established
to provide compensation to injured parties and to protect
other parties against potential liabilities, i t is also
riers and self-insurance.
The State Insurance Fund (also referred to herein
as the Fund) is adninstered by the Utah State ~epartment
of Finance (hereinafter referred to as "Depar~~ent" or
"Defendant").

The Department has repeatedly refused to

pay the tax imposed by U.C.A., Section 31-14-4(1) (b) (1953),
_claiming it is unconstitutional.
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The State Insurance Fund is established, and its
operations are governed and regulated, by Chapter 3 of
Title 35 of the Utah Code Annotated, to which the numbers
hereafter will largely refer.

It has been held by this Court

that it "is a state-administered mutual insurance program
established by the Legislature for the purpose of insuring
employers against liability for compensation and assuring
to the persons entitled thereto the compensation provided by
law."

Gronning v.Smart,

561 P.2d 690.

The State Insurance

Fund is a public fund and is publicly administered by a
public body, the Finance Commission.

Chez v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 62 P. 2d 549, 90 Utah 447.

While

i t is a "public fund" it is also not public money to be
spent in any manner desired by the public authorities, but
rather the legislature, in Title 35, Chapter 3, U.C.A.,
has set forth the relationship between the State Insurance
Fund and other state agencies.
The State Insurance Fund is very unique as i t is
literally in a class by itself.

While it is similar to pri-

vate insurnace companies in that it is set up and established
to provide compensation to injured parties and to protect
other parties against potential liabilities, i t is also

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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very dissimilar in all other respects, and some of the
unique characteristics of the Fund are as follows:
1.

The Fund is established as a

non-r~ofit

organ-

ization so that the premiums need not be high enc .. Jh
to produce a profit, but only to cover the claims
which are filed by injured employees against the Fund.
2.

The Fund does not have any investors or share-

holders who require a return on their investment.
3.

The Fund does not employ salesmen who earn com-

missions, so no sales commissions are paid by the Fund.
4.

The administrative expenses of the Fund are

provided by way of appropriation from the

resour~es

of the Fund by the legislature, but they are reduced
substantially below those expenses for private insurance companies because:
a.

The commission of finance administers the

fund, writes compensation insurance and conducts all
of the business appertaining thereto.

Section~-3-3,

U.C.A.
b.

The commission of finance must rate the haz-

ards relating to accidents and occupational diseases;
and must establish the premiums for those hazards.
Section 35-3-4, U.C.A.
c.

The commission of finance must make agree-

ments for the settlement of claims, compromise claims
of doubtful validity and determine to whom and through
whom
payments
areFunding
to forbe
made.
35-3-5,
U.C.A.
Sponsored
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digitization
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d.

The commission of finance must issue the

policies of insurance and must prepare all of the necessary forms, agreements and policies.

Section 35-3-6,

U.C.A.
e.

The commission of finance must receive all

of the premiums paid to the fund and must then transmit those funds to the State Treasurer.

Section 35-3-7,

U.C.A.
f.

The commission of finance must receive

the written notices of withdrawal from any employer
withdrawing from the Fund.
g.

Section 35-3-8, U.C.A.

The commission of finance has the respon-

sibility to determine if any of the risks should be
reinsured with any other insurance carrier and to
then enter into any necessary reinsurance agreements.
Section 35-3-9, U.C.A.
h.

The commission of finance has the full

responsibility to establish the appropriate rates,
set up and maintain an adequate reserve, and to keep
an accurate record of the premiums received, the
administration expenses, the claims disbursed, and
must further keep separate records for each individual
employer.
i.

Section 35-3-10,

u.c.A.

The commission of finance must adopt and

promulgate all of the necessary rules and regulations.
Section 35-3-11, U.C.A.
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j.

The commission of finance has the responsi-

bility to collect, by civil action in court if necessary, apy amounts owed to the Fund by any employer.
Section 35-3-17, U.C.A.
k.

The State Treasurer is the custodian of

the Fund, and must wisely invest those funds and must
then issue the appropriate vouchers on the Fund.
Sections 35-3-12 and 13, U.C.A.
1.

The State Insurance Fund is provided with

free legal counsel by the state Attorney General and
by the various county attorneys.

Section 35-3-20,

u.c.A.
m.

Audits on the State Insurance Fund are per-

formed by the State Auditor, presumably without charge,
whereas private insurance companies must retain an independent certified public accounting firm to perform
audits.
5.

While Section 35-3-1, U.C.A, does provide that

the administrative expenses are to be provided by legislative appropriation from the resources of the Fund, the record in this case does not disclose what amounts, if any, were
appropriated by the legislature to pay for those administrative expenses, nor does the record in this case disclose the
amounts of such administrative expenses for any of the years
in question.
6.

Insurance companies, which pay a Utah insurance
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7.

Largely because of the factors cited above,

the State Insurance Fund has been able to provide the insurance to employers for only fifty (50) per cent to seventy
(70) per cent of the ?remiums which are otherwise charged
by private insurance carriers.
8.

Prior to 1971, when the statute in question

in this proceeding was enacted by the legislature, the State
Insurance Fund paid a

lower total premium tax than private

insurance carriers because the Fund did not pay a premium tax
on premiums received from governmental agencies or political
subdivisions, nor on the occupational disease disability
portion of the

premi~rn

received from other employers, whereas,

?rivate insurance carriers did pay a premium tax on those
premiums.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIFFE?.E~CE IN TAX RATES BETWEEN THE
STATE INSU~~CE FUND AND OTHER PRIVATE INSURANCE CARRIERS IS BECAUSE OF THE ADDITIONAL
BENEFITS A~D SERVICES WHICH ARE PROVIDED TO
THE STATE I~SURANCE FUND BY THE STATE AND
ITS OFFICERS AND AGENCIES, AND DIFFERENCES
IN TAXES ARE PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE t•lHEN
THERE IS ALSO A DIFFERENCE IN THE BENEFITS
AND SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE TAXING AUTHORITY.
As mentioned, the Fund is a non-profit, publiclyadministered insurance plan designed to provide employers
with relatively inexpensive workmen's compensation insurance.

The Fund is able to offer lower premiums because of

two basic reasons.

First, the Fund, as a creation of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State Legislature which was provided its initial capital
by legislative appropriation, does not have shareholders who
must be provided with an annual return on investment, and
secondly, and most importantly, the State of Utah provides many services to the Fund \vhich are not provided
to any other private insurance company or self-insurer.
A prime example of those additional services which
are provided to the Fund by the State of Utah without any
direct charge is that the Fund has received free legal
servicesin this case as well as in Gronning v. Smart,
supra.

As this Court is well aware, legal services can be

very expensive and free legal counsel constitutes a substantial benefit to the Fund, which by its genesis, function, and purpose is a litigious type of organizati.on.
Further, if the Fund does receive free auditing and investment services by the State Auditor and State Treasurer,
those are very valuable services and benefits to an organization in a fiduciary capacity with large amounts of funds
to invest and for which to account.

If these services were

not provided free of charge, then the Fund,as is necessary
with private insurance carriers, would have to hire highly
paid executive employees to invest the funds, and would also
have to hire a certified public accounting firm to perform
an audit on the books and records of the Fund.
Because the state provides these services and benefits to the State Insurance Fund, it can also require the Fund
to
help
cost
through
use ofof
taxation,
and
Sponsored
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that rate of taxation may be different when additional
services are provided than it would be for other insurers
for which those services are not provided.
In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. The City and
County of Denver, 182 Colo. 136, 511 P. 2d 497 (1973),
plaintiffs contended that the tax imposed upon them, which
was based upon the number of employees working in Denver, was
unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.

The court disagreed by upholding the

ordinance in question.
United States

Supre~e

The Court, in quoting from a
Court decision, Wisconsin v. J.

c.

Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 61 S. Ct. 246, 85 L. Ed. 267
(1940), stated:
"For constitutional purposes the
decisive issue turns on the operating incidence of a challenged tax. A state is
free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the constitution, if by the
practical ooeration of a tax the state has
exerted its power in relation to opportunities w~ich it has oiven, to protection ·
which it has afforded, to benefits which
it has conferred by the fact of being an
orderly civilized society.

*

*

*

*

*

The simple but controlling question is
whether- the state has given anything for
which it can ask return.
(at page 499)
(emphasis added.)
The Court added that the tax was not on the privilege of
doing interstate business but on the privilege of using
services and facilities provided by the City of Denver.
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"The clear purpose of the tax is to
require that businesses located within Denver
pay a fair s~are of the expenses incurred
by Denver in ?roviding those services and facilities." (at page 499) (emphasis add"'d.)
The tax in our present situation, although factually different, is based on the same reasoning.

The

State Legislature is requiring those who receive the
benefits of the State Insurance Fund to help meet the
expenses the state incurs by providing the various services set forth in the statement of facts.
An earlier Utah case pronounced this court's
adherence to that principle.

In Garrett Freight Lines v.

State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523 (1943),
the Court declarec:
"Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which
he assumes by contract.
It is but a way of
apportioning the cost of government among
those who in some measure are privileged to
enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens."
(Page 526).
Whether or not the tax reflects the exact amount
of benefits received is of little import unless the tax is
not a fair approximation or is discriminatory or excessive.
The court in the Union Pacific case, again quoting from
the U. S. Supreme Court (in the case of Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 405
U. S. 707, 92 S. Ct. 1349, 31 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1972) added:
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" [\·l] !"lile state or local tolls must
reflect a 'uniform, fair and practical standard' relating to public expenditures, it
is the amount of the tax, not its formula,
that is o= central concern. At least so long
as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use • . and is
neither discriminatory against interstate
commerc.2 :10r excessive in comparison \'lith the
governmental benefit conferred, it \vill pass
constitutional muster, even though some other
formula might reflect more exactly the relative
use of the state facilities by individual users."
(Page 499)

There exists no rule which requires a state to
impose a tax exactly equal to the expenditures spent by
the state in maintaini:1g a particular program.

Further,

the state is not required to use the best plan or formula for imposition of a tax.

It may use any plan that

is not oppressive or excessive and which reasonably

reflects

a close approximation of services provided.
Apparently, the State Insurance Fund wants the
best of everything.

It wants lower insurance premiums, low

cost administrative services, free legal services, free auditing services, free investment services, and lower or
equal taxes.

Unfortunately, services are never free.

And

as a result, those receiving the benefits of the services
must pay for them.
This principle was discussed by the Utah Supreme
Courtin Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas and Oil, 80 Utah 530,
15 P. 2d 648 (1932).

Although the case involved an inspec-

tion fee rather than an occupation tax, the dicta in the
opinion is applicable.
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"The amount of the inspection charge
is primarily with the Legislature and a
statute will not be held unconstitutional
as providing for an excessive charge unless
~t ~s so unreasonable and disproportionate
to the service rendered as to attack the
good faith of the law.
* * *" (Cite omitted) (Page 650) (Emphasis added).
The court, in discussing the fee, declared:
"If expenses are incurred in the
exercise of this police power, some one
must pay them, and it is only fair that
the private corporation enjoying the franchise and serving the public for profit
should bear this burden."
(at page 649)
While a distinction may exist between an inspection fee and an occupation tax, the principle behind the
two is the same; namely, the party receiving t.he service
should be required to pay for it.
The additional one percent (1%) tax imposed upon
the State Insurance Fund is the Legislature's method of apportioning the costs of the services being rendered, and that
tax should be upheld by this honorable court.
POINT II
THE LEGISLATURE HAS BROAD DISCRETION IN MAKING CLASSIFICATIONS FOR PURPOSES OF LEGISLATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF OCCUPATION
TAXES.
The Legislature is endowed with broad powers to
determine legislative policy.

In Sonitrol Northwest, Inc.

v. City of Seattle, 528 P. 2d 474, 84 Wash. 2d 588 (1975),
the Court, supportive of this position, stated:
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"Legislative bodies have very extensive powers to make classifications for purposes of legislation."
[citations omitted.)
And in 0. G. Sansone Co. v. Department of Transportation,
127 Cal. Rptr.

799, 55 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1976), the Court

added:
"[T]he legislature is vested with wide
discretion in making the classification and • • •
its decision as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will not
be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary and beyond rational doubt erroneous.
[citations) • • • • The legislature need
not treat similar evils identically or legislate
as to all phases of a field at once [citation);
• • • a classification is not void because it
does not embrace within it every other class
which might be included [citation)."
When the legislature makes certain classifications, those
classifications are presumed valid.

This policy has been

considered and supported numerous times by the Utah supreme Court.
In Lehi City v. Meiling, City Recorder, 87 Utah
237, 48 P. 2d 530 (1935), it was stated:
"In approaching the subject we have
in mind the rule that when an act of the
legislature is attacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the question presented is
not whether it is possible to condemn the
act, but whether it is possible to uphold
it. The presumption is always in favor
of validity, and legislative enactments
must be sustained unless clearly in violation of fundamental law. Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161.
Every presumption will be indulged in favor
of legislation and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of power will authorize judicial interference with legislative action. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40
S. Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 878."
(at page 247)
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Section 31-14-4, U.C.A.
of validity.

(1953) is entitled to a presumption

Unless respondents can clearly show that this

section of the code is unconstitutional, it must stand.
Concerning the legislature's use uf discretion

in making laws, the courts generally allow the legislature
even greater latitude than usual in the area of taxation;
especially when the purpose of the tax is to increase revenue.

In Menlove v. Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203,

418 P. 2d 227 (1966) the plaintiff urged the court to
declare an ordinance unconstitutional which imposed a
transient room tax upon innkeepers.

In upholding the ord-

inance this court classified the tax as an occupation tax
which was levied in order to increase revenue.

The court,

quoting from a prior U. S. Supreme Court decision, New York
Rapid Transit Corporation v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573,
58 S. Ct. 721, 728, 82 L. Ed. 1024 (1938) stated:
"The power to make distinctions exists
with full vigor in the field of taxation,
where no 'iron rule' of equality has ever
been enforced upon the states.
[citations omitted] A state may exercise a wide discretion
in selecting the subjects of taxation [citations omitted] particularly as respects occupation taxes, [citations omitted].
* * * (at
page 230)
The court added:
"The constitutional provision which
imposes equality and uniformity of taxation
of property has no application to an occupation
tax."
(at page 229).
(Emphasis added)
[See also Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 616
(1950) .]

The court further stated:
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"Where neither the constitution nor a
statute imposes absolute restrictions on
the power of taxation, the courts mav not arbitrarily impose any, unless it clea~ly appears
that the tax imposed is oppressive or clearly
and unreasonably discriminatory, and this is
an abuse of the taxing power. This court cannot set up its judgment against that of the
legislature in determining who shall be required to contribute to the revenues."
(at
page 229)
Clearly the burden of proof is on the respondents.

They

must show that the tax imposed by Section 31-14-4 is oppressive or unreasonably discriminatory.

This has certainly

not been done in this case because no evidence whatever has
been presented to the court.

The nature of the tax in

question, since it is not a property tax, does not require
equality and uniformity.

The legislature has not abused

its taxing power simply because the rate of taxation assessed against the premiums paid into the State Insurance
fund is not identical to that imposed upon private carriers.

More must be proved than a difference in the rate of

taxation to show that the legislature has overstepped its
bounds.

The principle involved in this tax is very similar

to federal and state personal and corporate income taxes
where the tax rate differs based on differing levels of
income, but with no other distinctions in classification.
The passage of Section 31-14-4 and the creation of the
State Insurance Fund as its own classification was well
within the legislature's power to make laws and therefore
is valid.
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POINT III
SECTION 31-14-4, U.C.A., IS A GENERAL LMJ,
NOT A SPECIAL ONE.
The term "general laws" was defined in State
v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414 (1939), citing from
25 R. C. L. 814, as follows:
"Constitutional law--what are general
laws. Laws which apply to and operate uniformly upon all members of any class of persons
peculiar to themselves in the matters covered
by the laws in question, are general and not
special.
(emphasis added)
(at page 505)
In the Lehi City case, supra, the act being challenged created a metropolitan water district.

It was urged

that this enactment was a special law rather than a general one and hence violated Article VI, Section 26 of the
Utah State Constitution.

In rejecting this contention, the

Utah Supreme Court stated:
"The mere fact that its benefits may,
under present opportunities and conditions,
be availed of by a part of the state only,
does not mitigate against its validity as a
general law. City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain,
supra. While only one group of cities or
towns may now attempt to organize under its
provisions, yet at any future time other
cities and towns may do likewise. The act is
not limited to any particular cities or towns,
or to any particular locality in the state,
but it operates uniformly on every city or town
which may choose to take advantage of its provisions.
In form, as well as in substance,
1t 1s a general law and not special. Salt Lake
City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P.
207; In Re Orosi Public Utility District, 196
Cal. 43, 235 P. 1004. (Emphasis added)
(at
page 249)
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that this enactmen~ was a special law rather than a general one and hence violated Article VI, Section 26 of the
Utah State

Constit~~ion.

In rejecting this contention, the

Utah Supreme Court stated:
"The mere fact that its benefits may,
under prese~t opportunities and conditions,
be availed of by a part of ~he state only,
does not mitigate against its validity as a
general la>·;. City of Pasadena v. Chawerlain,
supra.
While only one group of cities or
towns may now attempt to organize under its
provisions, yet at any future time other
cities and towns may do likewise.
The act is
not limited to any particular cities or towns,
or to any carticular locality in the state,
but it operates uniformly on every city or town
which may c~oose to take adv~ntage of its provisions.
I~ form, as well as in substance,
it is a general law and not special. Salt Lake
City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423,-209 P.
207; In Re Orosi Public Utility District, 196
Cal. 43, 235 P. 1004.
(Emphasis added) (at
page 249)
In comparing this language to the present case it
can be seen that Section 31-14-4 is limited at the present
time to only the State Insurance Fund.
employer is forced to participate.

However, not one

They do so because they

find the State Insurance Fund more advantageous than the
other alternatives, even with a slightly higher premium
tax.
join.

The program is open to any employer who wishes to
The State Insurance Fund is not administered in a

manner which unfairly discriminates among employers.

True,

there is a distinction made between the Fund and private
insurance carriers.

But, as long as that distinction does

not allow a person to exercise the privileges i t offers while
refusing it to another of like qualifications and under
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like circumstances and conditions, it is not objectionable.
Section 31-14-4 is a general law and not a Special
law, and is therefore constitutional.
POINT IV.
SECTION 31-14-4 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH ru~NDMENT.
A statute is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment if it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.

If

there is any reasonable set of facts which might sustain
the act, it is to be found constitutional.

Sonitrol North-

west, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 528 P. 2d 474, 84 Wash. 2d
588 (1975).

The burden of proof is on the one claiming

the law to be discriminatory.
In 0. G. Sansone Co. v. Department of Transportation,
127 Cal. Rptr. 799, 55 Cal. App. 3d 434 (1976), the court
found that a statute permitting the Departnent of Transportation to withhold payments to contractors whose subcontractors had failed to pay their workers minimum wages was
not unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs in that case contended

that the minimum wage law discriminated against public works
contractors because it did not apply to contractors working on private construction projects.

In response to this,

the court, quoting from an earlier case, declared:
"Public agencies, generally speaking,
afford a proper subject for legislative classification.
[citation]."
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The court also added:
"The Legislature may constitutionally single out a particular segment of
industry for regulation without necessarily running afoul of the equal protection
clauses of the state and federal constitutions."
(At page 816)
The dicta in this case suggests that the Legislature
may constitutionally single out a particular segment of
an industry for regulation and it may also draw distinctions between public and private agencies for the
purposes of classification.

This being true, the Utah

Legislature did not overstep its bounds in enacting
Section 31-14-4.

It is perfectly permissible to separ-

ately classfy those employers who belong to the State
Insurance Fund and those who insure their workers privately.

This classification is not unreasonable simply

becauseoneis administered publicly and the others privately.

This distinction becomes even more reasonable

when the purpose of the classification is for taxation.
As was nentioned in the

~1enlove

case, the Leg-

islature has even broader power to make classifications
for the purpose of taxation than it does in general.

Un-

less the classification is unreasonable or arbitrary,
the court must uphold it.

s.

In The State of Utah v. Samuel

Taylor, 541 P. 2d 1124 (Utah 1975), the defendant as-

serted that he was denied equal protection of the law
because the ordinance of which he complained discriminated
against small businessmen.

The ordinance required busi-
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upon the gross income of the particular business.

"De-

fendant argues that this system of taxation casts a disproportionate burden on the small businessman and thus
violatesthe equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."

The Utah Supreme Court, in quoting from a

United States Supreme Court decision which upheld a similar
occupation tax, declared:
"The court stated that the rule of equality of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require exact equality of taxation, but only that
the law imposing the tax shall operate on all
under the same circumstances. The Court ruled
that where a tax on the privilege of doing business was graded according to the value, it may
not be deemed inequal in operation solely because
it does not levy the same percentage on every dollar."
(emphasis added)
(at page 1125)
The Utah Supreme Court added:
"The United States Supreme Court has adhered to this interpretation that the equal protection clause imposes no iron rule of equality
upon the states in the exercise of their taxing
power. The state is not required to resort to
close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition,
use, or value."
(at page 1125)
The Court further stated:
"Under a taxing statute, if the exempted
persons or businesses may be included in a distinct class, then the equal protection of the
laws has not been denied to those taxed. There
is nothing unreasonable in the legislative determination to designate the insurance business
as a distinct class and to create a separate
scheme of taxation therefor."
(at page 1126)
It seems rather apparent that the Legislature has
broad power in enacting tax statutes.
Taylor case,

As stated in the

it also has the power to create a separate
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scheme of taxation for the insurance business.
31-14-4 is part of that taxation scheme.

Section

It is not arbi-

trary or capricious but is based on distinctions designed
to increase revenue to pay for increased expenses without
substantially adversely affecting any interested party.
In support of this policy, the Court in Texas
Company v. Cohn, 112 P. 2d 522, 8 Wash. 2d 376 (1941),
stated:
"~\'hen the rule is applied to a tax
law, however, it should be done with due appreciation of the fact that usually the principal object, and very often the sole object
of such a law, is to raise revenue for the
support of the taxing government. Thus,
the state may constitutionally tax one
class and exempt other classes if the classification reasonably tends, in some la..,rful
way, to facilitate the raising of revenue."
(at page 529)

And in the Sonitrol case, supra, the Court said:
" . . • [T]he object sought is the
raising of revenue and so long as the rate
is not so excessive as to be confiscatory,
the tax is valid." (at page 477)
What is confiscatory?

In the Sonitrol case, the

plaintiff alleged that a Seattle ordinance was discriminatory and confiscatory.

Plaintiff manufactured burglar

alarms and was taxed at a rate of 70 times that of its
competitors, who dealt in local alarms.

Its tax was 7%

compared to the 1/10 of 1% imposed upon the other companies.
The Court held that the tax was not unreasonable.
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"The fact that the higher tax rate on
appellant's business may put him at a competitive disadvantage is of no moment.
[citation]
"Only where a tax is confiscatory and intended to drive a class out of business altogether, will the competitive element be considered.
[citation]" (at page 478)
The tax in the present case was just the opposite
effect.

It tends to distribute the taxes more evenly.

As

previously mentioned, the tax imposed by Section 31-14-4
is based on the amount of premiums paid by the employers.
However, the premiums paid by those employers who belong to
the State Insurance Fund is only 50 to 70% of the premiums
paid by employers to private insurance carriers.

To place

the same rate of taxation on both groups seems grossly unfair.
In effect, respondents are demanding the best of both worlds.
They want lower premiums and lower taxes, even though they
may be insuring the same occupational risks.
Applying Section 31-14-4 as it now stands, look at
a hypothetical.

Assume that a lineman working for a power

company has premiums on his wages of $1000.00 to a private
insurance carrier.
$32.50.

The tax on those premiums is 3-1/4% or

If that same lineman's employer had purchased its in-

surance coverage through the State Insurance Fund, the premiums would have been 50 to 70% of that paid to the private
carrier or $500.00 to $700.00.
4-~/4%or

$21.25 to $29.75.

The tax on that amount is

Even with the additional one per-

cent the taxes to the State Tax Commission are still less for
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AQditio~ally,
duc~i~g

a business

taxatic::1.

~as

a

differen~e

in the method of con-

been upheld as a valid basis for

In Cit\· c:: San Hateo v. Mullin, 59 Ca 2d 652,

139 P. 2d 351 (1943), the city passed an ordinance which required attorneys, a"o::1g others, to pay an annual license
tax.

If two or more attorneys worked together the addition-

al tax on every attorney over one was less than t..'lat paid for
the license of the first attorney.

This ordinance was at-

tacked as being discriminatory and unconstitutional.
ordinance was upheld by the Court declaring it
on a reasonable classification.

t~

~E

The

oased

The Court also added:

"A difference in the method of conducting
a business is generally a sound basis for classification, particularly if it appears that the
tax was fixed in proportion to the amount of business, which ~ay be determined by different but
reasonable nethods.
[cite omitted] (Page 353)
Further the Court reasoned:
"The method of operation resulting in
superior or more convenient service furnishes a
reason for a distinct and separate classification. The power to license a business for the
purpose of revenue involves the right to make
distinctions between essentially different methods of conducting the same general character of
business."
(page 353)
It would seem that this reasoning is applicable
to the case at bar.

The services provided by the state
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make the State Insurance Fund more convenient and attractive to potential members.

It is able to offer lower ~re-

miums because it is not profit-oriented, and yet, i t is in
direct competition with private carriers.

This distinction

alone should provide a sufficient basis for taxation.
It is hard to believe that a 1% difference in taxation is unconstitutional when a difference of 70 times has
been upheld.

One percent isnotconfiscatory especially when

the end result is to more evenly tax identical risks.
In Sonitrol Northwest, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 528
P. 2d 474, 84 Wash 2d 588 (1975), the Court summed up its
responsibility in this type of case.
"It is not the function of this court
in cases like the present to consider the propriety or justness of the tax, to seek for the motives, or to criticize the public policy which
prompted the adoption of the legislation. Our
duty is to sustain the classification adopted
by the Legislature if there are substantial differences between the occupations separately classified. Such differences need not be great.
The
past decisions of the court make this abundantly
clear."
(at page 478)
In the present case, the tax exacted is neither confiscatory
nor unreasonable.

It does not violate the equal protection

or due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

There-

fore, Section 31-14-4 should be declared valid.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SU~1ARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THERE WERE STILL GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH
NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE A SUMHARY JUDGlli:NT
COULD BE GRANTED IN FAVOR OF THE DEPART1-1ENT
OF FINANCE.
In Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc. 11
Utah 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960), this court stated the principle to be followed by the trial court when ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.
"A sUini!\ary judgment must be supported
by evidence, admissions and inferences
which when viewed in the light most favorable to the loser shows that, 'there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.' Such showing
must preclude all reasonable possibility
that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor."
[See also Morris v. Farnsworth Hotel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P. 2d
297, 298 (1953).]

In essence, the court said that if any

material fact is in dispute or if the losing party could show
facts under which it would be entitled to judgment, then the
Court must deny the motion for summary judgment.
In the present case both of these grounds exist.
To begin with, before a summary judgment could be granted in
favor of the defendant, the Court would have to determine whether sufficient distinctions exist between the State Insurance
Fund and private insurance carriers to justify the Legislature
adopting separate classifications for purposes of taxation.
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This question was never resolved at the trial level.
Additionally, several issues which would have a bearing on the question of sufficient differences between the two
types of insurance programs were left unanswered.
L~e

First, does

State Insurance Fund pay a portion of the State Treasurer's

salary since by law he is the custodian of the Fund's accounts
and he is required to invest the Fund's monies, or is his salary completely paid for by the State?

Second, does the Fund

pay for any of its legal services or are they all provided without cost by the Attorney General's Office?

Third, the Director

of Finance administers the State Insurance Fund.

Does he receive

compensation from the Fund for these services or is his entire
salary paid for by the state?

The same question could also be

asked of the state employees who are directly under his supervision and control.

Additionally, the record does not disclose

exactly how the premiums for the State Insurance Fund relate
to thepremiums of private insurance carriers, or how the tax
cost of a specific risk with the State Insurance Fund would
compare and relate to the tax cost of that same risk with a
private insurance carrier.
The Legislature presumably appropriates money to administer the State Insurance Fund from the monies of the Fund,
but are they sufficient?

Is the state partially subsidizing

the program by way of additional money or through the form of
free services?

None of these questions were answered in the

trial
court.
It appears
that
if any
ofby thethese
could
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be answered in a light more favorable to the plaintiff then
defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted prematurely and in error.

In In Re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d

83, 348 P. 2d 683, 685 (1960)

the Court said that summary

judgment is only proper if the pleadings, affidavits, etc.
show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The moving party in our present case was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

If the answers to the questions

raised herein would show that the State Insurance Fund does
in fact receive benefits from the state or would in any other
way place the case of the State Tax Commission in a more favorable light, then defendant was not entitled to summary judgment.

On the other hand, i t is submitted that the statute

on its face, when reviewed with the relevant provisions of the
law, could have been, and should have been, upheld as valid
by the lower court.

Therefore, while the plaintiff-appellant

believes that this honorable court should rule affirmatively
in its favor, at the very least, the case should be remanded
to the trial court for a determination of the genuine issues
of fact which are still in issue in these proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Legislature has been given broad powers in
making classifications for the purpose of legislation.

These
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legislative decisions are entitled to a presumption of validity and must be upheld unless it is shown that they are palpably unreasonable.

It is submitted that the legislature has

determined that a slightly higher tax should be paid because
of the additional benefits and services received by the Fund.
Section 31-14-4 is not unconstitutional simply because it makes a distinction between the State Insurance
Fund and private insurance carriers.

It must be assumed

that employers considered the advantages as well as the disadvantages of both programs before deciding which to participate in.
Under Section 31-14-4, employers actually pay the
same or a lesser amount of tax for insuring the same type of
risk.

The one percent difference in rates cannot be considered

arbitrary or confiscatory.

Section 31-14-4 must be upheld

as a valid exercise of power by the legislature.
Therefore, it is submitted that this honorable
court should hold that Section 31-14-4(1} (b)

is valid and

constitutional on its face, or should remand this case to
the District Court to make determinations on the unresolved
issues of fact.
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